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This paper is a defense of two hypotheses against a challenge to both. The main 
hypothesis at issue is that of direct compositionality (e.g. , Montague, 1 973),  which 
is that the syntax and semantics work in tandem. Thus the syntax "builds" (proves 
the well-formedness of) expressions and each expression is assigned a model­
theoretic interpretation as it is "built" in the syntax. This view thus makes no use 
of mediating levels of representation such as LF, and as such requires no extra 
apparatus mapping surface structures into LFs (or vice-versa). The sub-hypothesis 
here is the hypothesis of variable-free semantics (see especially Jacobson, 1999, 
2(00), which is that the semantics makes no use of variables (and hence no use of 
assignment functions) and the syntax concomitantly makes no use of indices. A 
corollary of this view is that variable names are an artefact, and can never play a role 
in the statement of grammatical phenomena. Although these two hypotheses are 
logically independent, the two go rather naturally hand in hand: one reason for this 
is that dispensing with variables removes many of the apparent challenges to direct 
compositionality. Space precludes discussion of this here ; see Jacobson ( 1999, 
2000a) for a detailed exposition of the link between these two hypotheses. 
Thus the goal of this paper is to examine one case where it looks like 
variable names are indeed crucial ; this centers on an analysis of Heim ( 1997) of 
some facts from Kennedy ( 1994) . I argue that Heim' s  basic insight is indeed 
correct - but that using the tools of variable names is the wrong way to implement 
the insight. I will then propose that recasting the insight in a variable-free semantics 
- using what we might call "healthy" model-theoretic objects (i .e . , model-theoretic 
objects which make no use of assignment functions as part of their building blocks) 
- will account for the same cases, while avoiding some of the problems caused by 
the use of variable names. 
1. Background 
I will elucidate the problem using the "conventional" terms ; thus my discussion 
here uses notions like variables and LF. For the moment, I will also assume that an 
elided VP requires there to be a linguistically overt expression which serves as its 
"antecedent" - that is, there is some overt expression which satisfies some identity 
condition either on form or meaning with the elided material . The story begins 
with Sag ' s  dissertation (Sag, 1976), in which he made the following claim: Take an 
elided VP (hereafter, VPFlL) and take its antecedent VP (hereafter, VP ANT) . Let the 
two be identical (for Sag, this meant identity of LF) and let them both contain 
variables which are unbound within them. Then, even if the two variables have 
identical names, the identity condition is not satisfied unless the two are ultimately 
bound by the same thing. (See Partee and Bach, 198 1  for a discussion of the non­
compositionality of this condition if it is recast into semantic terms.)  
Almost under any view of identity (form, or meaning) , Sag ' s  condition 
would be an unpleasant surprise. But fortunately (for every theory), we now know 
that this condition is incorrect. Some of the facts that led to Sag ' s  conclusion were 
simply wrong, others have independent explanations, and there are perfectly good 
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cases which would be incorrectly blocked by this condition. Thus Evans ( 1 988) 
points out that (1) and (2) are impeccable, and Jacobson ( 1992) notes cases like (3) :  
( 1 )  Bagels, I like. Donuts, I also do. (Evans, 1988) 
(2) I know which rivers Bill likes to swim in, and I know which rivers/lakes 
Mary does. (Evans, 1988) 
(3) MarYi asked John to water heri plants , and Sue asked Bill  to. (okay on 
sloppy reading ; Jacobson, 1992) 
And yet, there is one case for which it looks like Sag ' s  condition might be 
right: this involves ACD and is discussed in Kennedy ( 1 994) . (The sentences in 
(4) are a modification of Kennedy ' s  facts. Also, Kennedy considers additional facts 
which I do not have space to discuss): 
(4) a. John kissed every girl who Bill did. (kiss) 
b. *John kissed every girl who knew a boy that Mary did. (kiss) 
c. *John kissed every girl who knew a man who liked a woman that Bill did. 
(kiss) 
2. Heim, 1997 
There is an intriguing analysis of these due to Heim ( 1997) .  First, , Heim adopts 
Rooth' s  focus condition on ellipsis (Rooth, 1992) which can be stated as follows: 
(5) Consider a VP FlL and a VP ANf' Then VP FlL must be contained within some 
constituent CFlL and VPANT must be contained within some constituent CANf 
such that the meaning of CANf - or something which follows from this 
meaning (where "follow from" need not be logical entailment, but can be 
a pragmatic inference) - is a member of the focus value of CFlL. 
Put slightly differently, take "meanings" to be functions from assignment functions 
to something else. then, for all g, [ [CANT]]g (or something which follows from this) 
g must be a member of [ [C�] Foe . We see in (6) a typical case of VP Ellipsis 
which very happily satisfies this condition: 
(6) John left. BILL did too. 
For the sake of exposition, let me temporarily oversimplify Heim' s  actual 
proposal. Her claim is that the good cae of ACD is good because the elided VP and 
its antecedent have the same variable name in object position, as shown in (7) :  
(7) 
In this case, for all g [ [CANf]]g is a member of the focus value (i.e . ,  is an alternative 
to) [[CFlL]]g , and so Rooth ' s  condition is met. But in a bad case such as (4b), the 
variable names are different, as shown in (8) (here, and throughout this section I 
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will ignore the contribution of the head noun as it is  basically irrelevant; I assume 
that the relative clause combines with the head and then with the determiner, but will 
suppress the full details here); 
(8)  
_____ 
S _______ 
DP s. = CANT 
� �  / �  
every (girl) x S John [YP-ANT kiss x] 
DP--- --- � 
� � _/_�----. 
a (boy) y S. = CFlL x knew y 
e==::: ::=:--::.. 
MARY [YP lHss-y] 
Here Rooth' s  condition is not met, since there are assignment functions g such that 
[[CANT]]g (which is the proposition that John kissed g(x) ) is not an alternative to the 
proposition Mary kiss g(y) (which is the attempted C�. Notice that putting it this 
way assumes that CANT and CELL would have to be as shown above ; the interested 
reader can verify that there are no other two expressions that one could find to serve 
as CANT and CElL' 
The appeal of this analysis is that the contrast between these and the Evans 
cases follows effortlessly. In the good Evans' cases, CANT and CElL can both be big 
enough so that the offending variable is bound within each, and so the contrast is 
possible. Thus consider again ( 1 ) .  In this case the representation for CANT is, 
roughly: [bagels, x [I like x]] and the representation for CElL is [DONUTS, Y [I 
like y]] .  Here the variables are bound within these; for any g, the focus value of CElL 
is t set of propositions: {I like bagels, I like muffins, I like croissants, . . .  } and CANTg 
is a member of this set. Similar remarks hold for (2) and (3). 
3. Advantages and Problems 
It seems to me that there is something deeply right about part of this solution. By 
blaming the offending cases on an inability to get the focus considerations right, the 
contrast between the Kennedy cases and the Evans cases falls out immediately : in 
the ACD (Kennedy) cases we can't set up appropriate contrast domains (essentially 
because one is contained within the other), but in the Evans case we can. The use of 
variable names here is an attempt to "track" individuals ;  the insight is that in (4b) 
and (4c) the ellipsis is not good because the individuals serving as object of kiss in 
each case are - in some difficult to pin down sense - not the "same individuals". I 
will claim that this insight is exactly correct, but that variable names are not the right 
way to pin this notion down 
Notice that of course if Heim' s full solution were right, it would present a 
serious challenge to the claims of variable-free semantics: which i s  that variable 
names are an artefact and should never play a role in the semantics. Moreover, the 
entire analysis poses major challenges to direct compositionality as it makes crucial 
use of the interpretation of LF expressions - expressions which do not correspond 
to anything in the obvious (surface) syntax. 
In fact, though, there are problems with Heim' s  analysis which might make 
one suspicious of the particular tools used in this implementation. In the first place 
- a point noted by Heim herself - this requires a stipulation on the reuse of variable 
names (what she dubs the "No Meaningless Coindexation") condition. This 
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condition can be stated as: In any LF, if a variable Xi is bound by some binder a ,  
then all other occurrences of X i  must also be bound by a .  (Compare this, 
incidentally, to Sag ' s  condition on the names of unbound variables within VP ANf 
and VPElL: Sag ' s  condition was on VP ellipsis whereas Heim' s  is more general, but 
it interacts with the focus condition on ellipsis to make the same predictions in these 
particular cases. ) The necessity of this condition cannot really be shown by a case 
like (4b), because in that case if the two were "accidentally coindexed" we would 
simply get the wrong meaning. However, the crucial case is (4c), where without this 
condition nothing would block an LF like that in (9): 
(9) S 
----- -------
DP 
-
S = CANf 
------- ----- /' ====== -
every (girl) X S John [vP-ANf kiss x] 
DP----- � S 
--------- � � 
a (man) y '  S x knew y 
Dr ------ S 
------ ........ / "'"  
a (Woman) x S = CElL Y liked x 
/'" ::::...;:: 
BILL [vp �] 
Here Rooth' s  focus condition would be met since the same variable occurs in the 
object of CElL and CANT and yet the sentence remains bad: this is  because in some 
sense these are not the same individuals, they are made so only by "accidental" co­
indexation. While the accidental co-indexation condition will indeed stop this, it is a 
complete stipulation once one uses variables and follows from nothing else in a 
system with variables. (In recent unpublished work, Kennedy (2003) attempts to 
derive part of Heim' s  condition from the hypothesis that assignment functions are 
partial ; space precludes discussion of this here.) 
That is the theoretical problem. There is an additional empirical problem, 
discussed in Jacobson ( 1998). This is that this does not allow for a case of 
contrasting DPs, as in ( 10), which is impeccable: 
( 10) Every boy that the teacher praised envied every boy/GIRL that the 
PRINCIPAL did. 
To demonstrate this, I need to return to an aspect of Heim's  proposal which I 
oversimplified above - which is that Heim's  analysis also requires that quantification 
is over assignment functions, not individuals. (Indeed, this is the main point of her 
paper, aptly titled "Predicates or Formulas?".) The motivation for this conclusion 
is as follows. Take the standard view of quantification, where quantifiers are 
relations between two functions of type <e,t>. Then consider again (4b). If we were 
to unpack the kind of shorthand notation for LFs used above, the LF for this would 
be as shown in ( 1 1 ) . (Following the sort of notation used in Heim and Kratzer, 
1998, think of i and j as variables over integers): 
( 1 1 )  
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s 
---- ----
DP A = CANT 
� "--- ,/ '-----
every (girl) A j S 
_____ '--- L� 
i S John kiss tj 
------ ----
DP S 
/ � L":'>.,. 
a (boy) A = CElL tj knew tk 
/ ,  
k �� 
MARY -less-\ 
Let me stress that the particular syntactic details of the LF don' t  really matter: the 
point is that there would be some expression (C� which is the meaning of who 
MARY did kiss- and which is a function of type <e,t>, and another expression (CANT) 
which is also of type <e,t> and which is the argument of the generalized quantifier 
which is raised from (or substituted onto) the object position. And since both of 
these are of type <e,t> they form an appropriate contrast. Like the Evans' cases, the 
variable within each of these is bound (it has been A-abstracted over) and so the 
difference in variable names should not matter. Thus for any assignment function g, 
the alternatives to CElL here are alternative properties: its focus value is a set like 
{Ax [Sue kissed x] , Ax[Bill kissed x] , . . .  } .  
Thus it is crucial in Heim' s account that the semantic composition doesn ' t  
involve any expression of type <e,t>; this i s  accomplished by taking quantification to 
be over assignment functions. For example, let the LF for Every man walks to be 
as in ( 12), with the semantics of ( 1 3) :  
( 12) every x [man,x] [walks, x] 
( 1 3) [ [every x [<1> ] ['¥]]g = 1 iff V g '  just like g except possibly for 
assignment to x, [ [<1>]](g ' )  ---> [ ['¥]](g ' )  
Under this view, a DP like every man actually has no meaning (since the determiner 
takes both arguments simultaneously), but this can be easily remedied by Curry ' ing 
its meaning. In that case, the LF for Every man walks would be as in ( 14) and the 
semantics is given in ( 15) :  
( 14) [DP every x [s man,x]] [s x walks] 
( 1 5) Let G be a variable of type <g,t> (i .e . ,  a set of assignment functions) 
Let <1>' be the semantic value of <1> - hence <1>' is of type <g,t> 
Then: the meaning of everyx 4> = 
AG[Ag[Vg' exactly like g except for the value assigned to x, 
[<1>'(g') ---> G(g')]]] 
Notice that with this semantics, a DP of the form every x [man,x} does not have the 
same meaning as every y[man,y}. Although it may look like the variables in these 
are fully bound they are not: these are actually open expressions and are open on 
different variables. One can easily verify this by considering what happens when 
each of these combines with a sentence of the form x loves y. 
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But now given this fact, consider again ( 10) .  The only expressions which 
could count as CAND and CFll. would be the subject and object DPs ; indeed our intuition is that these are what is being contrasted. And yet, under this semantics, 
there are assignment functions g such that the value of the subject DP under g is not 
a member of the focus value of the object under g. That is [[every xl student, x and 
the teacher praised xJ Jl is not a member of [[every y, student y and the 
PRINCIPAL praised yloC. Again this is because each of these are " o p e n "  
expressions - and are open on different variables. 
4. Copy Identity 
Before turning to my account of the facts, let us consider an alternative 
proposal due to Sauerland (2004) (hereafter, S) .  S ' s  proposal does not make 
crucial use of variable names, but does make use of a variety of devices incompatible 
with (at least a strong version of) direct compositionality, and thus it too - if correct -
would challenge to the general program here. But, I will argue, S '  s proposal also 
has serious problems. The initial observation is that the effect is lessened 
(according to S ,  it disappears) if the heads are the same or have roughly the same 
meaning: 
( 16) a. *John kissed every woman who likes the boy that BILL did. 
b. ?John kissed every woman who likes the woman that BILL did. 
c. ?John kissed every woman who likes the one that BILL did. 
(Judgments here are my own; S predicts ( 16b) and ( 16c) to be perfect.) 
To vastly oversimplify S analysis (in ways which hopefully do no harm to 
the main points), S assumes the following (note that I use the category N wherever S 
uses the category NP, so keep in mind that by "N" I mean something which can be 
complex and consist of, for example, a relational noun and its complements). A. The 
matching theory of relatives - according to which a relative pronoun actually 
consists of a determiner and lexical material of category N, and where the lexical 
material is deleted under semantic identity with the head. B. The copy theory of 
movement - according to which moved material leaves a copy of the head (the N) 
portion in the position of the trace. Moreover, the interpretation of the head in the 
trace position constitutes a restriction on the individual variable in object position. 
Thus following work by Fox, the interpretation of the trace is as follows: 
( 17) Let P be a predicate (i.e. , linguistic material of category N). Then [[� - P] ]g 
= g(x) if P(g(x)) and [[� - P]]g is undefined otherwise. 
These two assumptions combine to predict that lexical material which has the same 
meaning as the head will be present in the position of the trace, so that in ( 16a) for 
example, the object DP will be every girl who Bill kissed tx _ girl" The contrast 
between ( 16a) and ( 16b) now follows straightforwardly. Along with Heim, S adopts 
Rooth' s  focus condition and - along with Heim - the analysis pins the problem on 
the fact that there is nothing which can serve as CANf and CFll.. But here the problem 
is not because the obvious candidates have different variable names in object 
position, but rather variables restricted over different domains. Thus in ( 16a) CANf is 
trying to be John kissed twoman and CFlL is trying to be BILL kissed tbo (I ignore 
here the indices on the traces since they play no role), and the meaning of the first is 
not a member of the focus value of the second. (Note: here there is no need to 
adopt the view that quantification is over assignment functions. Take the standard 
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view, and "move up the tree" to where we have two properties. It will still be the 
case that the result holds.)  In ( 16b) on the other hand, both CAN[ and CEIL contain 
woman-traces in the object position, and so the focus condition is met. 
This immediately raises an obvious question: how do we account for the 
contrast between the (bad) Kennedy cases and the (good) Evans cases? After all, in 
the Evans cases too we have a copy of the lexical head in the trace position, and so 
cases like these should be bad if the heads are different. But in fact they do not 
require head identity - as shown by ( 1 )  and by ( 1 8): 
( 1 8) I like the lake you visited, and I (also) like the RIVER that you did. 
S ' s  explanation for this is  as follows.  In the Kennedy cases, the trace position 
contains a copy of the lexical head of the wh pronoun, which in tum is identical (in 
meaning) to the lexical material in the head. In the Evans case, the idea is that there 
is no movement trace in the lower position. Rather, it is a silent pro over N type 
meanings (that is, meanings of type <e,t>, which is a bound variable, bound by the 
head. (The precedent for this comes from an analysis of Schwarz ( 1 999) of some 
cases of sloppy identity with deleted VPs Schwarz' s  account involves allowing VPs 
in some cases to be pronouns at LF which are interpreted as bound variables, and 
where the lexical material binding these is raised. Sauerland extends this proposal 
to the case of nouns : let these also be proforms interpreted as bound variables.) 
Thus ( 19) gives a rough rendering of S ' s  proposed LF for the lake you visited, 
though note that ( 19) is adorned with some extra symbols to help show how the 
semantic composition works. (20) gives the interpretation of the x [pro): 
( 19) the lake you visited = lakes APt <e l> [the (tt <e l> n 
the x [prot <e 1>] ) ] 
, , A x [you visited 
(20) [[the x [proj <e,l>] ] ] g = La [ g(x) = a and g(pro)(a) ] (undefined if 
g(proj)(a) is false) 
Note that in the end the interpretation of the LF in ( 19) is the same on all assignment 
functions since prot has been A-abstracted over. As a consequence, on all g, 
[ [LAKE you visitedll] will be a member of the focus value of [[RIVER you did 
Ws#ll. (One can also set CAN[ and CEIL as bigger expressions; for example the 
entire first conjunct is a member of the focus value of the entire second conjunct.) 
The key difference between this and the Kennedy case is  that in the latter, the 
meaning of the head noun provides a restriction on the variable in object position, 
and CANT and � will have different restrictions. Here the only thing that restricts 
this variable is whatever set g assigns to prot ' but if we move high enough up then g(prot)  becomes irrelevant because we A-abstract over prot . 
Of course now we must ask: why not the same possibility in the (bad) 
Kennedy cases? The story - in a nutshell - is that Rooth' s  focus condition could not 
be satisfied in the Kennedy cases. Even if we were to raise the lexical content of the 
N and have it bind a pro-form, there could be no way to get contrasting domains and 
this in tum is due to the containment property. In the (good) Evans cases, on the 
other hand, each of the pro-Ns can be bound separately, and since the domains are 
distinct, the domains consisting of the binder (the lexical head) and the bindee can 
be in contrast. I refer the reader to S '  s actual paper for more detail .  
But this proposal has some very suspicious aspects to it. First, i t  is a pure 
stipulation that "pro" itself has no lexical content identical to the head (or at least 
none which plays a role in the semantic interpretation) . Notice that the account 
requires not only that traces have lexical content (which, one might argue, is simply 
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there as a remnant from movement) , but that certain kinds of overt pronouns also 
do. In particular, the entire story told above crucially assumes that relative pronouns 
have lexical content: this is necessary because they need to leave copies of this in 
the trace position. So why should overt pronouns have lexical content but not the 
silent N-pro? Secondly, part of the "independent motivation" for the copy theory 
of movement - which is crucial to the above story - is the supposed fact that the 
head exhibits certain connectivity effects with the position of the trace. But once we 
allow heads to raise and bind N-pros,  this explanation disappears (S does have 
discussion relevant to this point, to which I return momentarily). Since the 
connectivity effects with respect to relative clause heads are sometimes claimed to 
be a bit more complex, let me clarify with a question wh-movement case. 
So, consider the folk (wisdom that (21 )  is bad (I use * here as a report of the 
received judgments; I think that these merely require the right discourse conditions): 
(21 )  a. *Which argument that John was wrong did he finally accept? 
b. *Which uncle of John's  did he invite? 
But what would stop (22) as a representation for (21b), where we have just a pro in 
the gap position? 
(22) uncle of John' s  AP 1 <e,!> [which tl <e,!> [A x [he invite the x [pro- 1 <e,!>] ] ] ]  
One might entertain the following answer: perhaps raising of the head is possible 
only when the head is focussed. While plausible, this is of no help, as the effects 
persist with focus. (rhus the * in (23) means that these are no worse than (21 )) :  
(23) a. *1 know which good argument that John was wrong he finally accepted, 
and I know which BAD argument that John was wrong he didn't. 
b. *1 know which UNCLE of John ' s  he invited, and I know which AUNT 
of John' s  he didn 't. 
Note that (23) contrasts with (24): 
(24) I know which UNCLE of John' s  Mary invited, and I know which AUNT of 
John' s  she didn' t. 
In fact, S already notes a related problem (centering on the interaction of 
Principle B and Schwarz ' s  analysis of VP-pro) and, following Schwarz suggests 
that VP "pro" actually behaves syntactically like a full copy of its binder. Hence, 
S points out to me that one can say the same about the N-pro here. But note that it 
is absolutely crucial to the entire story above that this pro not behave semantically 
like the a full copy of its binder. So it must be in the position of the gap for the 
purposes of syntactic constraints and yet the semantics must somehow know to 
"ignore" this material in computing the semantic composition. How this would 
actually work is unclear to me. The proposal is framed within a theory in which 
syntactic representations (of LFs) are constructed and "sent" to the semantics for 
model-theoretic interpretation; I do not know how the semantics can be smart 
enough to ignore the interpretation of certain material which is there in the syntax. 
Moreover, this idea helps with the account of Principle C violations above 
only if we believe that Principle C is stated in purely syntactic terms. (It would thus 
have to be just a constraint on co-indexation.) And yet it is well-known that it 
cannot be stated this way: a constraint on co-indexation is not enough to block 
Principle C violations in which the offending pronoun is free and happens to pick 
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out the same referent as a full NP or name which it c-commands.  One kind of 
solution would be to remove it from the grammar altogether and hope (with Kuno 
many others) that it is really a constraint on information packaging in discourse. 
But then there is no reason to believe that sentences like (23) give any evidence for 
copy movement, and so there becomes no independent motivation for one of the key 
pieces of the "copy identity" analysis of Kennedy ' s  facts. A second kind of 
solution is to take roughly the sort of view proposed originally in Reinhart ( 1983) -
where the free reading of a pronoun in which it is "accidentally" coreferential with 
a c-commanded name is  blocked in virtue of the fact that there i s  another 
representation/interpretation pair which gives the same reading. But in that case, the 
ultimate statement of the constraint which would block (23) is going to have to look 
at the interpretation of the LF with a copy of the head in the pro position, and so it is 
untenable to posit material which is there "in the syntax" and not "in the 
semantics". (Notice that since Schwarz ' s  analysis of VP pro has similar problems 
it is subject to the same remarks.) The upshot of this is that it seems that the copy 
identity solution is unlikely to be correct. 
5. Towards a solution: the necessary ingredients 
The claim I would like to make here is that Heim' s  basic insight i s  correct, but it 
should be translated into direct model-theoretic terms without the intermediate use of 
indices and without the concomitant conventions on the reuse of indices. Thus I 
agree with two main aspects of her analysis. One is that the key difference between 
the (good) Evans cases and the (bad) Kennedy cases lies in the ability to construct 
contrasting domains for the purposes of Rooth' s  focus condition. (S ' s  analysis 
also shares this property.)  Second, with Heim I agree that the good vs. bad cases of 
ACD have to do with the "open-ness" of the object position: the bad cases are in 
some sense "about" different individuals while the good cases are about the same 
individual. We will now attempt to reconstruct this intuition in variable-free terms. 
First, let me clarify a point about ellipsis in general . I have been using the 
terminology of a deletion account where the "missing" material i s  actually 
linguistically present. An alternative is that the missing material is just like a "free 
variable" over VP meanings (and so - in terms of a variable-free semantics - this 
means that a constituent containing a VP ellipsis site has as its meaning a function 
from VP type meanings to propositions ; see Jacobson, 2003 for full details). What 
is picked up, then, is a contextually salient meaning. I actually believe that this is the 
right way to think about it, but because this would complicate the exposition I will 
continue to use the terminology of the first way. Second, I embed the explanation in 
a Categorial Grammar syntax. We thus now tum to the ingredients. 
1 .  The Focus condition First, we need to recast Rooth ' s  focus 
condition in direct compositional terms. I will actually not fully do this here, but let 
us begin with the following "semi-direct compositional" formulation, which has 
certain aspects in common with the formulation in Merchant (2000) (although 
phrased rather differently): 
(25) Let a be an expression of the form <[a] ,  VP, [[all>. Then there is an 
expression � of the form <[fIS] , VP, [[a]] ,  > provided that: 
( 1 )  [[all is given in the context (= "identity condition"), and 
(2) a is contained within some larger expression (call it C� such 
that there is another expression CANf whose meaning is or makes 
contextually salient a member of [[CruJtOC 
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Notice that (25) replaces Rooth ' s  condition to the effect that CANt must mean or 
imply (possibly pragmatically) a member of [[C]tOC with the weaker condition 
that CANf must mean or make contextually salient a member of [ [C]]FOC. Because 
this modification will play a crucial role, it is imperative that the notion of "make 
contextually salient" ultimately be fleshed out better than is done here ; I leave this 
as a large promissory note. 
As mentioned above, (25 ) i s  not actually compatible wi th direct 
compositionality - in fact it is still quite uncompositional . In the first place, it is not 
a local property of some expression that its meaning is given in the context. In the 
second place, the focus condition requires us to look at the meaning of a larger 
expression which contains the "deleted" VP. However, these problems are actually 
artefacts of the some space-saving oversimplifications being adopted here and can 
be solved. For discussion, see Jacobson (2003a, 2003b). 
2. ACD as TVP Ellipsis. The next crucial ingredient is the analysis of 
ACD as transitive verb phrase (TVP) ellipsis (Cormack, 1 984, Evans, 1988, 
Jacobson, 1992) . Thus first consider the semantic composition of an ordinary 
relative clause: 
(26) John read every book that Mary will read. 
In the "standard" view of the semantic composition, there i s  a variable in the 
semantics as object of read (and a trace in the syntax), and this i s  ultimately A­
abstracted over so that that Mary will read has a meaning of type <e,t>. But there 
are a variety of approaches within Categorial Grammar and related theories in which 
there is no need to posit a variable here. Take, for example,  the approach in 
Steedman ( 1989): here the meaning of read simply function composes with the 
meaning of will and the result in turn function composes with the (type-lifted) 
meaning of Mary. Mary will read thus denotes the property Ax[read' (x)(m)J .  The 
ACD-as-TVP ellipsis analysis posits that the semantic composition of (27) is 
essentially the same: 
(27) John read every book that Mary will. 
That is, the missing or "deleted" material is only read (not read x) - we thus have 
just a "missing" meaning of type <e,<e,t» rather than a missing VP-type meaning. 
The same remarks hold for the cases in ( 1 )  - and indeed for any case in 
which the standard account posits that the deleted VP contains only a variable in 
object position. Again given the kinds of tools available in Categorial grammar (and 
related theories) in general and in a variable-free semantics in particular, all of these 
can be analysis as the ellipsis of just an expression whose meaning is of type 
<e,<e,t» . See Evans ( 1 988) and Jacobson ( 1 992) for details .  Incidentally, one 
might worry about the fact that in the standard view - where the missing material is 
read x - the existence of ACD and of Evans cases follows immediately from the 
existence of VP Ellipsis (once one discards Sag ' s  unpleasant condition). After all, 
all of these cases are ordinary VP Ellipsis. It is thus reasonable to ask whether the 
same is true under the ACD as TVP Ellipsis analysis - do we get the TVP ellipsis 
cases for free? Fortunately, the answer is yes, see Jacobson (2003a). 
3. Focus in a variable-freesemantics. We now come to the key 
ingredient of the analysis, which centers on the interpretation of focus in a variable­
free semantics. I am adopting Rooth ' s  ( 1984) alternative semantics, but the 
following question arises: how does the computation of alternatives interact with the 
interpretation of pronouns? In other words, consider (28) :  
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(28) Every manj said that hej RAN. 
Under the system advocated in Jacobson ( 1999), he RAN is of category SNP, and its 
ordinary meaning (leaving aside the semantic contribution made by the gender of the 
pronoun) is AX [ [ [ran]](x) ] (which is just [[ran]]) .  But what is its focus value? 
There are two obvious possibilities. One is that it is a set of alternative functions 
from individuals to propositions, thus a set like: {J...x[x walked] , AX[X danced] , AX[X 
jumped] , . . .  }. But a second possibility is that its focus value is actually a function 
from individuals to a set of alternative propositions (about that individual): thus its 
focus value is J...x[ {x walked, x danced, X jumped} ]. The key to my account of the 
Kennedy facts is  the hypothesis that the second is  correct - when we have an 
unbound pronoun within some constituent with focus somewhere, the focus value of 
that constituent is a function from individuals to a set of alternatives. 
Some independent motivation for this view is provided by the interpretation 
of focussed pronouns themselves (and of material containing focussed pronouns). 
Take the plain focussed pronoun HE. Under the variable-free system adopted here, 
its ordinary value is the identity function on individuals - each individual is mapped 
to itself. Again we can ask: what is its focus value? Is it alternative functions of 
type <e,e> - or is it a function from individuals to a set of alternative individuals? 
My own intuition is that the second answer is the natural one. 
But, intuitions aside, one can probe this further by considering what happens 
when we embed a stressed pronoun in further material. Before continuing, let me 
point out that Jacobson (2000a) notes that there are actually two kinds of cases 
where a pronoun can be stressed. One is discussed originally in Sauerland ( 1998) 
and where one pronoun is (informally speaking) contrasted with another: 
(29) Every third grade bOyj loves hisj mother and every FOURTH grade bOYj 
loves HISj mother. 
Cases of this type are quite interesting, but will not figure into the discussion here. 
Note, though, that a pronoun can also receive contrastive stress when - informally 
speaking - is being contrasted with some other individual: 
(30) Every third grade boy voted for Bill ' s  mother, but every FOURTH grade 
bOyj voted for HISj mother <his - as opposed to Bill ' s> 
In fact, I noted in Jacobson (2002) that with reflexives there is actually a difference 
in terms of which morpheme is stressed: 
(3 1 )  a .  Every third grade bOyj voted for himselfj, and every FOURTH grade bOYj 
voted for HIMself/*himSELFj. 
b. Every third grade boy voted for Bill, and every FOURTH grade bOYj 
voted for himSELF/*HIMselfj. 
The point of revisiting these facts here is that they make it fairly clear that the focus 
value of HE or of himSELF is not an alternative set of functions of type <e,e> but 
rather a function from individuals to alternative individuals. Thus the focus value of 
HE is AX[  {Bill ,  Tom, Mary, . . .  }] .  If we generalize from the case where the 
pronoun itself is focussed to the case in (28) - where there is an unbound pronoun 
and and something else is in focus - we arrive at the conclusion above: [[he 
RANltOC is a function mapping each individual to a set of alternative proposition. 
The key intuition here is that the semantic effect of a pronoun which is 
"unbound" within some expression C is for it to have widest scope - including over 
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the focus value. (This is analogous to what one would say in the standard view -
where the assignment function is always given "widest scope".) 
There is a second crucial point to note: the "widest scope" property is not 
true of argument slots in general . To clarify, consider the ordinary value of RAN. 
Its ordinary semantic value is exactly the same as the ordinary value of he RAN. 
Their syntactic categories are different (not surprisingly, since they have different 
syntactic distributions): the former is of category S/RNP which simply means that it 
is something expectinp to combine in the syntax with an NP (to its right), and the 
latter is of category SN which means that it is not expecting to combine with an NP, 
but rather that it contains an (unbound) pronoun within it. Both have meanings of 
type <e,t>, and - ignoring the gender contribution in he - both just denote the set of 
runners. But I claim that the two have different focus values. [[RAN J]FOC is in fact 
a set of alternatives of type <e,t>, while [[he RANltOC i s  a function from individuals 
to a set of alternatives. Of course this raises an important question: just how does 
the computation of alternatives work so as to actually get this result? Part of the 
answer to this question will have to be left for future research, although the 
beginnings of the answer is sketched below in the appendix. 
4. Relative clause gaps (in a Categorial Grammar) . Consider (32) :  
(32) every boy who) Mary kissed 
Within the work in Categorial Grammar - and in related theories such as 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) and Head Driven Phrase Structure 
Grammar (HPSG) - there are two broad classes of ways to think about the syntax 
of a relative clause which contains a "gap".  In one view (see especially Steedman, 
1987) Mary kissed is just an ordinary S/RNP. That is ,  it i s  simply something 
expecting to find in the syntax an NP on its right, and relative pronouns 
subcategorize for such creatures. But others (e.g. , Oehrle, 1 990) have argued that 
gaps are actually encoded in the syntax with a special feature (see also the work in 
GPSG and HPSG all of which takes essentially this view. (Note that given the 
general variable-free program this means that gaps and pronouns are similar.) 
Incidentally, the information that there is an (unbound) "gap" within something 
would pass up only until we reach the point where the rule system is such that this 
material is explicitly "asked for" (we can thus call it "bound" at this point). 
What this means is that boy (who) Mary kissed is presumably just of category N 
(recall that N can be lexical or complex). 
My analysis crucially relies on the premise that the second view above is 
correct: gaps within relative clauses are simply not the same as ordinary argument 
slots which expect to be filled in the syntax. But indeed there is  considerable 
independent motivation for this view; see for example Oerhle ( 1990) and Jacobson 
( 1999, fn. 19). We will notate an S with a gap in it as S INP. With this in mind, take 
the focus value of [[MARY kissedJ] in an expression like the boy who MARY 
kissed. Just as in the case of pronouns, the semantic contribution of a "gap" has 
widest scope - and so the focus value here is not a set of alternative properties (i .e. , 
it is not something like the set: {being kissed by Sue, being kissed by John, . . . }. 
Rather, it is  a function from individuals to alternative propositions about that 
individual - thus the focus value is Ax[{Sue kiss x, John kiss x, . . .  }] . To complete 
the picture, we need to say something about the focus value of a bigger expression 
like who Mary kissed. As discussed in Jacobson ( 1 998) there is good reason to 
treat relative pronouns as ordinary pronouns (as this allows for a simple, direct 
compositional account of the semantics of Pied-Piping). There are a number of 
ways to work out the full syntactic details of this pronoun and the full details of how 
this combines with an SINP like Mary kissed, and space precludes a discussion of 
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this here. Suffice it to say that under almost any reasonable way to look at this, the 
focus value of who Mary kissed will also be a function from individuals to 
alternative propositions. But, as noted above, the "gap" (and/or pronoun position) 
is presumably closed off in a fuller expression like boy (who) MARY kissed - so 
here the focus value will be a set of alternative sets. 
Call an expression with a gap or a pronoun within it (which is  unbound d 
within that ex�ression) one which is syntactically open. This includes expressions 
of category S P or S INP. These denote functions from (in this case) individuals to 
(in this case) propositions. So does an expression of the form S/NP - that is, an 
ordinary VP. But the essential claim here is that the former - the syntactically 
"open" expressions - have focus values which are functions from individuals to 
sets of alternatives, while the syntactically "closed" expressions (e.g. , a run of the 
mill VP) - has as its focus value just a set of alternatives of the same type. 
Since the remarks above may strike a reader as rather theory-internal, let me 
try to clarify what is at stake. I am not interested in stipulatin� that any expression 
whose syntactic category is SNP or S INP (that is ,  any expression with an unbound 
pronoun or gap within it) will have as its focus value a function from individuals to 
sets of alternatives. The hope is that the combinatory rules - which allow 
expressions of these categories to combine with others and which at the same time 
combine both ordinary semantic values and focus values - can be stated in a way that 
this result naturally follows. (Again, see the appendix for a first pass at this .) Thus 
an anonymous SALT reviewer objected that under the analysis here, the kind of 
focus value that an expression will have is not predictable from the type of its 
ordinary semantic value. This is correct - but there is no reason why it should be. 
Focus values are derived from the combinatory rules (or ' principles"), and this is 
where the action will have to be. 
5. Rooth 's/ocus condition/or open expressions. To complete the analysis, 
we need to decide one more thing: what is the requirement for satisfying Rooth ' s 
focus condition when CEIL is a syntactically open expression - and thus its focus 
value is not a simple set of alternatives but rather a function from individuals to 
sets? It seems reasonable to assume that in this case we need a larger expression 
CEIL whose meaning is a function f from individuals to sets of alternatives, and an 
expression CANT whose meaning is such that for every relevant individual x, the 
meaning of CANf is or makes salient some member of f(x). Notice that I am 
confining the requirement to the set of "relevant" individuals - and hence another 
promissory note is that this can ultimately be defined better than it is here, and 
given independent motivation. But the intuition is, I believe, fairly straightforward: 
the idea is that the focus value of (who) MARY did kis5ed is a function from 
individuals to alternative propositions about who kissed those individuals, and so if 
this is taken as CFlL, the only relevant individuals to consider are those who were 
indeed kissed by Mary. 
This final piece is the only piece for which I cannot cite independent 
motivation, and whether or not it is plausible ultimately depends on a better 
understanding of the focus condition in the first place. Surely (25) (or Rooth ' s  
version, or any other version) should follow from something else and should not 
simply be stipulated in the grammar, but until we know just what this "something 
else" is it is hard to know whether the extension of the focus condition proposed 
above is the right one for the case of "open" expressions . But the rest of the 
ingredients here are all independently motivated within the general program 
assumed here. For readers not familiar with this program it might seem like a lot 
of apparatus, so let me therefore try to restate a few of the points in more informal 
and more general terms. Fundamental to the entire discussion is the assumption 
that variable-free semantics is correct - and that expressions containing pronouns 
unbound within them are not functions from assignment functions to something 
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else but rather from individuals to something else. Once one is willing to buy into 
this ,  it seems not difficult to imagine that the focus value of an expression 
containing a pronoun is a function from individuals to sets of alternatives. 
Perhaps the most theory-internal part of the analysis will seem to be the apparatus 
developed in (4) which concerns the difference between syntactically open and 
syntactically closed expressions. But all this asks the reader to believe is that 
ordinary VPs (for example) which combine in the syntax with NPs have a different 
focus value from material with an unbound pronoun within it, and that this 
hopefully will fall out easily from the way the combinatory principles work. 
6. Accounting for the Cases 
We can now put this all together, and account for all of the cases considered 
above. We begin with a classic Kennedy violation, as in (4b) *John kissed every 
girl who knew a boy who MARY did ki:55-. As in Heim' s  analysis, we begin by 
trying to take CElL as (who) MARY did ki:55-. Whether or not we include who in the 
expression, the focus value is a function from individuals to alternative propositions 
about that individual. Thus to satisfy the focus condition as amended in (5) above, it 
needs to be the case that there is an expression CANT such that for relevant 
individual - that is, for every individual that Mary kissed - the meaning of CANT 
makes salient some proposition about someone (else) kissing those individuals. But 
without further contextual support, this is not met. (Indeed with additional support 
this can be met and I return to this below.) Notice that the fact that the sentence is 
about who John kissed is of no help, since for each individual that Mary kissed 
there is nothing relevant about whether or not John kissed that individual. Note too 
that moving to a larger expression (that is, to one which is "syntactically closed") is 
of no help. Take, for example, the boy who MARY did ki:55-. This is "closed" -
and we assume that the combinatorics is such that its focus value is just a set of 
alternative individuals {the boy who John kissed, the boy who Sue kissed, . . .  } .  But 
there is no CANT whose meaning is or makes one of these individuals salient. 
But wait - one should be saying - what allows for a good run-of-the-mill 
ACD case like (4a) John kissed every girl who BILL did ki:55- ? Have we not just 
ruled out ACD in general? The key here centers on the fact that quantifiers denote 
relations between sets . Because of this CANT can be the entire matrix sentence. 
Again, let CElL be (who) BILL did If:i:5.s.  The focus value is a function from 
individuals (and the relevant ones are just those that Bill did kiss) to alternatives 
about those individuals. Is there any CANT such that for each such individual, the 
meaning of CANT makes salient something about someone else kissing that 
individual? Indeed there is - the matrix does just this .  And in fact because 
quantifiers denote relations among sets , this will be true regardless of what 
quantifier we find heading the object (One might think that a sentence like John 
kissed no girl that BILL did ki:55- would be a problem. But note that for each x that 
Bill kissed, we learn that John didn't  kiss x .  That this "counts" as a valid 
alternative to Bill ' s  kissing x can be demonstrated by the fact that ellipsis is possible 
in John didn 't kiss Mary, but BILL did.) 
Thus I am claiming that Heim's basic idea is correct: normal ACD is good 
because in some sense the matrix and the relative clause are "about" the same 
individuals while this is not true of the Kennedy cases. But rather than attempting to 
track those individuals by use of the intermediary of variable names - which requires 
(among other problems) the No Meaningless Coindexation constraint - the strategy 
here is to track this in direct model-theoretic terms. 
What about the contrast between Kennedy cases and Evans cases? Here I 
claim that Heim' s story is exactly right, and carries over directly to the account here. 
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Consider ( 1 )  Bagels I like. DONUTS, I also do. Here the contrasting domains are 
the whole sentences. Notice that the interior portion of the second sentence (I also 
do Iike-) has as its focus value a function from individuals to alternative propositions 
(in this case, the only proper alternative is the proposition that I do like that 
individual). But the "openness" of this focus value does not matter, for we can find 
a closed expression - DONUTS, I also do - whose focus value is just a set of 
alternative propositions {I like bagels, I like muffins, I like croissants, . . .  } .  
But now take the case of contrasting DPs, as in ( 1 0) Every girl that the 
teacher praised envied every girl/BOY that the PRINCIPAL did. Recall that the 
problem for Heim' s  analysis is that these are both "open" - and are "open" on 
different variables. In other words, there are assignment functions g such that the 
value of every girl that the teacher praised on g is not a member of the focus value 
of every girl/BOY that the PRINCIPAL did pHlise on g .  But under the analysis 
here, these present no problem - the subject and object DPs can be in contrast 
exactly as we would expect should be the case. Thus the focus value of every girl 
that the PRINCIPAL did pHlise- is a set of alternative generalized quantifiers : 
{every girl that the teacher praised, every girl that the scout leader praised, . . .  } .  
(Notice that if  the heads are in contrast the story is the same - here the set of 
alternatives are those that vary both on the praisers and on the value of the head.) 
CANf is the subject, whose meaning is a member of this focus value. 
Since my analysis is meant as a reconstruction of Heim' s  analysis, why the 
difference? The difference has to do with the way the combinatorics works here -
we have hypothesized that "fancy ' focus values (functions from individuals to 
alternatives) arise only when we have expressions with pronouns and gaps within 
them. These are expressions which do not combine in the syntax with others in the 
"normal" way, and the combinatory rules combining them will also have the effect 
of yielding these fancy focus values. But generalized quantifiers are syntactically 
closed. Their ordinary semantic value is of type « e,t>,t>, but their focus value is not 
a function from properties to alternative propositions about those properties. Rather, 
it is just a set of alternative functions of type « e,t>,t>. The basic intuition here to 
keep in mind is that only pronouns and gaps contribute an argument position which 
has widest scope over the focus value. 
Finally, let us tum to the "Sauerland effect" - the fact that Kennedy cases 
improve if the heads are identical. Thus consider (33): 
(33) ?John visited every town which was near the town/the one that BILL did. 
My tentative explanation for the improvement here is that in this case CEIL is the 
larger expression the town that Bill did Ws# (or perhaps town that BILL did Ws#) 
where CANf is the entire S.  To develop the explanation, let me oversimplify a bit and 
ignore the presupposition contributed by the , combined with the singular 
morphology in the object. That said, the focus value of town that BILL did Wsif is a 
set of alternatives {the town(s) that John visited; the town(s) that Mary visited, . . .  } .  
But now note that the entire matrix gives information about town(s) that John visited, 
and hence makes salient a member of the focus value of the town that BILL did Wsif. 
Indeed, I believe that this corresponds with our intuition that the contrast is 
in fact between John ' s  towns and Bill ' s  towns. As such, these are best when the 
discourse context also supports conjuring up such a contrast. For example, these 
are happy in a context where it is assumed that each person did visit at least one 
town, and so it is easy to set up this kind of contrast. For this reason (34b) - which 
does not automatically lend itself to such a context - is  worse than (34a) - which 
supports a context in which it is assumed that each person did some town-visiting: 
1 59 
1 60 Pauline Jacobson 
(34) a. ?John visited every town which was near the town/one of the towns that 
BILL did (visit) 
b. ??John visited every town which was near a town that BILL did (visit). 
As further support for this general line ,  consider a DP like a/the river that 
DONALD TRUMP kayaks on. One can imagine two different reasons for stress 
on Donald Trump. The first is  what I will call the "wow, Donald Trump ! "  
reading - of interest the opposition of Donald Trump to u s  ordinary mortals .  The 
second reason would involve a scenario in which Donald Trump is a member of 
our kayaking club, and we know that each member of the club routinely kayaks on 
one river. In this case the contrastive stress differentiates rivers. Notice that we 
find a subtle but, I believe, real contrast with ellipsis in these two scenarios. (35) is 
set up to favor the "wow, Donald Trump !"  reading. Because there is no 
background assumption that everyone kayaks on some river it is harder to interpret 
the entire object as CElL and thus harder to take the information provided by the 
antecedent as a salient alternative. But (36) supports the reading where Bill ' s  river 
is a salient alternative to Donald Trump' s  river: 
(35) ???Every day, Bill kayaks on a river that just happens to be right next a 
river/one that (wow ! - of all people) DONALD TRUMP does. 
(36) ?Bill (always) kayaks on a river that is right next to the river/the one that 
DONALD TRUMP does. 
In other words, the extent to which we find the Sauerland amelioration 
depends on the extent to which we can stack the deck to get the entire object to be 
the domain for which we are looking for a relevant contrast (and the extent to which 
the subject matter of the matrix supplies this contrast). But in that case, one would 
expect that these should always be possible - even if the heads are different. In 
other words, we ought to be able to always ameliorate Kennedy ' s  effect with 
appropriate discourse conditions and appropriate contrast domains. And indeed, 
this is exactly what we find. Take, for example, a context in which last summer, each 
person in the kayak club kayaked on at least one lake and at least one river. Then in 
that context, (37) is fine 
(37) John kayaked on a lake that was in the same state as the RIVER that 
MARY did. (even better with stress on John) 
Or, in a context in which each teacher nominated one girl and one boy for the 
awards ceremony; here (38) is quite good: 
(38) Mary nominated a girl who dates the BOY that BILL did. (even better with 
stress on Mary). 
The conclusion, then, is that the Kennedy effect is actually highly discourse 
dependent; exactly as one would expect under a story were we are looking for 
"salient" alternatives. 
7. Appendix 
Here I lay out in preliminary fashion combinatorics for focus using the variable­
free apparatus in Jacobson ( 1999), showing how an expression with focus such as 
RAN can combine with a pronoun (or an expression containing a pronoun) to give 
the desired result. We begin with the observation that ran is of category S/NP. It 
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gets to combine with a pronoun (or with something containing a pronoun) by 
undergoing the "Geach" rule; which maps it into a function of type <<e,e>,<e.1» . 
What we need to do is to fold focus into this picture. 
Following Rooth ( 1984) assume that all expressions have both an ordinary 
value and a focus value (where an expression with no "focussed" constituent within 
it has as its focus value just its ordinary meaning). Thus for any expression a, let 
[ [ [a]]]  be the pair < [[a]] ,  [ [a]]Foe > Then the "Geach" rule (which allows an 
expression to shift into something which can take a pronoun in argument position) 
can be reformulated as follows: 
(39) For any expression a which is a triple of the form <[a], AlB, [[[a]]]> there is 
a corresponding expression 13 of the form <[a] , A e /Be ,  [ [[13]]] , where 
[[[13]]] is the pair: 
< Af<e b> [Axe [ [ [a]](f(x» ] ] ,  Af<e b> [Axe [{ZI 3Y [ Y  E [[a]toe and Z = 
Y(f(x» ] } ]] > . 
(So, note that the first member of this pair is [[13]] and the second member is [[13]toe. 
This will give the desired result. 
Endnotes 
* I 'm dedicating this paper to the memory of Frederic Evans, who died f AIDS almost 
exactly 10  years ago (from the presentation date of this paper) . Frederic ' s  direct 
contribution to this domain is obvious in the above (I think that the importance of the 
"Evans examples" is huge) but there' s  also an indirect contribution: he was Chris 
Kennedy' s  first syntax professor in graduate school (at Yale). I would like to thank 
Chris Barker and Uli Sauerland for helpful discussion on this paper. 
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